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THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
CONFRONTED WITH WORLD WAR I AND THE REPARATIONS’ ISSUE 
 
FANNY COULOMB 
 
 
The development of the neo-classical theory by the end of the 19th century had excluded 
issues of economic policy and international economic relations from the field of the mainstream 
economic analysis. The new “economic science” is apolitical and aims to explain the markets’ 
functioning within the framework of pure and perfect competition.  In terms of doctrine, the 
Liberals advocate for a minimal state and free trade. But the First World War, that broke out in 
a context of unprecedented economic and financial interdependencies at the world level, raises 
questions about the liberal optimism regarding the pacification of international relations 
through economic links. Moreover, the Russian revolution of 1917 enhances the popularity of 
the Marxist theory, which directly competes with liberalism: it is the return to the “political 
economy”. Some heterodox theories arise out of this very period: as soon as the early 20th 
century, Hobson had criticized the imperialist policies of capitalist countries, within a 
perspective of reform. World War I accelerated the development of another major theoretical 
critic of capitalism, the one of Veblen, the founding father of institutionalism.  The time is right 
for political debates, in which economists take part. Amongst Marxist economists, 
disagreements are numerous, in particular concerning the evolution of capitalism.  
 After the war, the issue of the reparations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles 
turned out to be important for the evolution of economic thought. Only in 2010 did Germany 
finish paying the last debts related to the post- World War I reparations, whose initial amount, 
determined in 1921 to 132 billion golmarks, has never been fully settled. These debts resulted 
from foreign loans to Germany, along with the Dawes (1924) and Young (1929) plans, aiming 
at reducing the reparations’ burden on the German economy. In 1931, the payments were 
nevertheless interrupted, while only 20 billion had been paid; they resumed in 1953. Become 
an adviser to the British Treasury in 1915 and directly implied with the issue of war 
funding, Keynes argues in vain against the option of total war for Britain. He is almost about to 
resign from the Treasury when the British government launches the call for conscription. After 
the German defeat, his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (ECP)1, published 
in 1919, is a major criticism of the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, allowing him to play a 
central role in the debate on the economic future of Germany. In the 1920’s, the study of 
international economic relations developed a great deal, thanks to the debates on the issues of 
reparations and inter-allied debts, notably in France, Great-Britain and in the United States.  
The question of Germany’s capacity to pay poisoned interwar international relations and fed 
the resentment against the « diktat » of the Treaty of Versailles. Later, the partial waiving of 
reparations sent out a signal favoring the German rearmament. The peace through free markets 
                                                          
1 Keynes J.M. (1920 [1919]), The economic consequences of the peace, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe. 
 
remains far, capitalism being plagued by financial disorders resulting from the war. Keynes will 
seek in his reflection on the inter-war economic and financial problems some principles 
underlining the General Theory, notably his mistrust towards world financial interdependencies 
ruled by speculation.  
 
 This paper first presents the debates amongst Liberal as well as Marxist economists, fueled 
by the First World War, on the role of conflicts and wars in the capitalist system. A second part 
will show how the discussion on the post-war European order acted as a catalyst for the 
evolution of the economic thought, with the rise of Institutionalism and the foundation stones 
of Keynesianism, favored by the very lively debate between economists on the issue of the 
German reparations.   
 
 
 
THE DISCUSSION ON THE REASONS FOR WAR IN A CAPITALIST SYSTEM 
 
 The explanation of the causes of the First World War is not easy for the liberal economists. 
In fact, the conflict occurs during an expansion phase of a Kondratiev cycle started in the last 
decade of the 19th century, with a first globalization began in the early 1870s and characterized 
by increasing international financial integration, facilitated by the stability of the gold standard 
system (but nevertheless leading to repeated financial crises), the rise in international trade 
interdependence and therefore the opening up of many economies, especially through 
investments in territories rich in raw materials. For the Liberals, why the pacifying effect of 
international economic relations has not worked is a challenge that few manage to overcome. 
The liberal theory is not the only one to question its doctrinal foundations. Marxism is indeed 
so challenged that strengthened by the world conflict, which arouses diverging interpretations. 
The theorists of imperialism in fact often disagree on the issue of the inevitability of inter-
imperialist wars and on their destructive impact on the capitalist system. 
 
The failure of the Liberals’ assumption of the achievement of peace through 
economic interdependence 
 
 The pacifism of liberal economists during the 19th: the influence of Bastiat 
 
 The question of war and peace had been widely discussed by the Liberal economists during 
the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in France.  A disciple of Jean-Baptiste 
Say, Frédéric Bastiat, who is quoted by Karl Marx as “the most superficial and therefore the 
most adequate representative of the apologetic vulgar economy”2, et who has been claimed as 
a reference by the enthusiasts of ultraliberalism in the 20th century, raised the issue in his 
writings, without however completing his chapter on the war in his Harmonies Economiques, 
                                                          
2 Marx K. (1873), Capital I, afterword to the second German edition, quoted in Fine B., Saad-Fihlo A., Boffo M. 
(2012) The Elgar Companion to Marxist economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, p. 247. 
the text titled "Comment la guerre finit” remaining unfinished (chapter XIX)3. But Bastiat 
represents those Liberals who consider that war can only come from the pressure of private 
interests to the detriment of the general interest, an idea already present in Adam Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations4 . The idea behind the Bastiat’s thought is that wars will end when public opinion in 
European countries will acknowledge the superiority of liberalism and free trade, incompatible 
with international conflicts and their side-effects: economic disorganization, greater state 
control and disruption to international trade. He does not fear the invasion of France and even 
suggests the unilateral disarmament of the country in 18495, to set off a wave of pacifism at the 
European level. In a letter titled Propriété et Spoliation6, defending the principle of ownership, 
Bastiat explains that it is the principle of dispossession, an inherent tendency of mankind, which 
is the origin of inequality among men: the economic freedom combined with the principles of 
justice can only lead to peace and global prosperity. All means of dispossession must be banned 
from human societies: not only war and slavery by also excessive taxation, public borrowing 
and war on capital. 
 In his wake, many proposals have emerged within the liberal current, for institutions capable 
of arbitrating international disputes, to avoid open conflicts that would increase the state control 
on public life7. By the end of the 20th century, many congresses for peace have been held, 
where economists’ influence was great8. In 1901, the first Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Frederic Passy9, a French politician and ardent pacifist aiming to mobilize public opinion to 
promote a culture of peace, together with the promotion of liberalism.  
 Keynes’ pacifism and support of Angell’s views 
 Keynes’ critique of the Versailles Treaty in the ECP is precisely part of this liberal pacifist 
tradition. He did not hide his enthusiasm for the League of Nations, founded in 1920, which 
raised much Pacifists’ hope in the interwar period, but which however quickly showed its 
limitations. Keynes had moreover welcomed, a decade earlier, the book of his compatriot 
Norman Angell, titled The Great Illusion10, which denounced the European arms race and 
criticized the principle of war reparations. The basic premise underpinning Angell’s work is the 
idea of peace through economic globalization, given the fact that: 
- The economic benefits of colonialism are illusory ; 
- The potential economic cost of wars between industrial superpowers has become too great 
for policies of aggression to be considered, as economic isolation would very swiftly lead to 
economic exhaustion.  
                                                          
3 Bastiat F. (1893), « XIX : Guerre », in Harmonies Economiques, tome sixième, 10ème édition, Librairie 
Guillaumin et Cie, Paris, p. 576. 
4 Smith A. (1776), An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, London, Methuen & Co Ltd. 
5 Bastiat F. (1849), Paix et liberté ou le budget républicain, Bastiat.org. 
6 Bastiat (1848), Propriété et spoliation, July, www.Bastiat.org. 
7 As for example Gustave de Molinari, a Belgian disciple of Bastiat and vice secretary of the Association pour la 
liberté des échanges (Association for free trade). See Coulomb F. (2004), Economic theories of peace and war, 
Routledge. 
8 Coulomb F., Hartley K., Intriligator M. (2008) : “Pacifism in economic analysis : a historical perspective”, 
Defence and Peace Economics, 19 (5).  
9 Jointly with Henry Dunant, who created the Red Cross movement. 
10 Angell N. (1910), The great illusion, G.P. Putnam’s son, NY and London. 
- The wars of predation are over, military conflicts’ costs being too high because of 
destructions and induced economic disturbances, which cannot be fully covered by a potential 
war indemnity. Moreover, war indemnities can only be paid by the defeated country through an 
exports surplus that would compete directly with national products in the recipient country, 
with adverse economic consequences.  
This questioning of war reparations’ effectiveness has influenced Keynes, when he wrote the 
ECP. Enthusiastically welcoming Angell’s work, Keynes supported his (successful) candidacy 
for the Nobel Peace Prize, in the early 1930s11. But the liberal pacifist optimism expressed in 
Angell’s work of 1910 was tempered in a second edition, published in 1933. For his part, 
Keynes had already ceased writing on the reparations issue since many years.  
 
 An heterodox call for peace : Hobson’s denunciation of the Western world’s imperialism 
 As explained above, the liberal thought on war at this time was focused on challenging its 
cost and economic non-sense, as well as on the idea that war can only result from a diversion 
of the State machinery to private interests: it is not the capitalist system that is at issue, as the 
free operation of markets should on the contrary generate a common welfare, making wars 
always more absurd.  
But an alternative interpretation of the imperialist policies of capitalist countries had been 
suggested at the beginning of the twentieth century, by a British essayist supporting war 
resisters in the 1910s and, at that time, supporting the « new liberals » alongside Keynes12: this 
is John Hobson, whose book published in 1902, Imperialism : a study13, made him famous, all 
the more so as large parts of his analysis have been used by Lenin in his own analysis of 
imperialism.  
In his book, Hobson condemned the fact that liberalism needed jingoism, which allows 
maintaining the docility of workers who are subjugated by an increasingly mindless labor. He 
also explained that colonial expeditions are not only made to respond to the megalomania of 
national leaders and to make the people dream; they also have a distinct economic objective: 
let the surplus of the capitalist production slim down in the international markets. This idea, 
which is already present in Marx’s 1848 text On the question of free trade, will be largely taken 
up by Lenin. Hobson thinks that the solution is to raise public’s purchasing power so as to create 
internal opportunities for the capitalist production; one of the main reasons of wars would 
therefore be eliminated.  
 Hobson has published several papers in the review The Nation, that was acquired by Keynes 
in 1922. But their political paths separated in the late 1910s, when Hobson joined the future 
                                                          
11 Citer Alcouffe A., Coulomb C. (2014), De la paix par le libre-échange à l’interventionnisme pour la paix : 
l’évolution de la pensée de J.M. Keynes de la première à la seconde guerre mondiale, draft paper for the 
XVe International Conference of the Association Charles Gide pour l'Etude de la Pensée Economique, Lyon, June.  
12 Dostaler G., Vignolles B. (2009), « Keynes et ses combats », Idées Economiques et Sociales, vol 3 n°157. 
13 Hobson J. (1902), Imperialism: a study, James Pott and Company, New York.  
Labor Party. However, in the General Theory (1936), Keynes pays respect to Hobson’s ideas, 
emphasizing his “ardour and courage against the ranks of orthodoxy”14.  
 
The discussion within the Marxist current on the issue of the interimperialist 
war 
 The Marxist analysis of war and militarism in the early twentieth century lacks of unity: 
there are considerable divergences between theoreticians, regarding notably the inevitability of 
a conflict’s outbreak and its impact on the proletarian movement.  
 From Marx’s economic war to Lenin’s inevitable collapse of imperialist powers 
 Karl Marx himself did not write specifically on these issues, maybe because he reserved his 
analysis of militarism for the last volume (never written) of The Capital, dedicated to the issue 
of the state. However, in his speech On the question of free trade (1848)15, he states a central 
idea for the Marxist rhetoric during the 20th century: the world trade will become increasingly 
contentious as capitalist systems mature, because export markets represent an efficient counter-
tendency to the rate of profit to fall, while imports of cheap foreign products allow to exert 
downward pressures on workers’ wages.  All capitalist countries at the same stage of 
development having the same commercial and colonial appetites, economic conflicts may occur 
and the class war transform into a war among nations. Mocking the optimistic and pacifist views 
of the Liberals, Marx writes:  
To call cosmopolitan exploitation universal brotherhood is an idea that could only be 
engendered in the brain of the bourgeoisie. All the destructive phenomena which unlimited 
competition gives rise to within one country are reproduced in more gigantic proportions on 
the world market16.  
However, free trade is considered more progressive than protectionism, which is viewed with 
distrust, as well as nationalism, chauvinism and independence movements, by Marx and Engels.  
The Leninist theory of imperialism only partially comes from the Marxist idea of increased 
international disputes because of the transfer of internal economic contradictions on the world 
market. Besides, Lenin doesn’t refer to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in his theory of 
1916, Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism17.  
It is the unequal development of national economies and of monopolies that lead to international 
relations’ instability, at the stage of imperialism. With the rise in capital exports and in the 
economic concentration, the States are no more the central actors but the monopolies which 
                                                          
14 Keynes J.M. (1936), The general theory of employment, interest and money, Macmillan Cambridge University 
Press, chapter 23, VII. 
15 Marx K. (1848), On the question of free trade, Speech to the Democratic Association of Brussels at its public 
meeting of January 9, www.marx.eserver.org 
16 Op.cit. 
17 Lenin V.I. (1916), Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, in Lenin’s Selected Works, Progress 
Publishers, 1963, Moscow, Volume 1, pp. 667-766, www.marxists.org 
control the world trade and make progressively disappear the free competition. The fight for 
raw materials exacerbates antagonisms on colonies’ sharing; the new industrial powers, wishing 
to reverse the international economic hierarchy, are responsible for the outbreak of inter-
imperialist conflicts, until the ultimate world war that will end capitalism.  
 
 The non-orthodox scenarios of some Marxist economists 
 Within the Marxist current, Lenin’s theory was challenged by several competing and more 
or less incompatible analyses. If he does not criticize Hilferding, to whom he has borrowed the 
concept of financial capital but who had stated that, in the long term, an agreement between the 
more powerful capitalist interests, is very likely, Lenin targets Kautsky.  
Hilferding is the theoretician of the “financial capital”, appeared at the end of the 19th 
century18 : this capitalist model is characterized by a deterioration in competition, an increased 
concentration of industry and bank sectors and the growing power of just a few  shareholders. 
The role of the state is enhanced because the state apparatus serves the interests of certain 
monopolies or cartels, with the setting up of protectionist measures that are circumvented by 
foreign direct investments. Moreover, the militarism is inherent to the financial capitalism, 
notably because the colonial expeditions allow to secure national economic interests abroad, 
the supply of raw materials but also to open foreign markets for domestic industrial goods. Only 
a strong pacifist opposition of the proletariat and of the medium class will permit to avoid a 
war between imperialist powers. However, in the longer term, the rise in firms’ size and the 
internationalization of their activities, will lead to an agreement between the most powerful 
capitalist interests, beyond national borders, with the setting up of agreements between national 
cartels. The international agreements ensuring the inter-cartels peace must nevertheless be 
regularly reviewed, with the change in the balance of international power. This idea about an 
agreement between the most powerful interests, at the world level, was revisited by Kautsky, 
with the concept of « ultra-imperialism ».   
 Like Hilferding, Kautsky sees the state’s power politics as being in the service of bourgeois 
interests, as it helps prevent the under-consumption crises and the proletarianization of the 
middle class. If Kautsky had an important role, from 1890 to 1914, within the Third 
International, he was no more considered an orthodox Marxist from 1915, when he published 
a paper in Neue Zeit that was fiercely contested by Lenin19. Kautsky indeed defended the 
hypothesis of another stage of capitalism, subsequent to imperialism: ultra-imperialism. At that 
stage, not yet been reached (and maybe will never be), it is likely that the struggle between 
national capital is replaced with a joint exploitation by a worldwide integrated financial capital, 
therefore limiting incentives for an arms race between capitalist economies. This theory 
irritated Lenin, who called Kautsky an “ex-Marxist”.  
                                                          
18 Hilferding (1910), Finance capital, A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development. Ed. Tom Bottomore, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981, Marxists.org. 
19 Karl Kautsky (1915), Die Neue Zeit, 30 avril 1915, p. 144. This article is quoted is in Lenin (1916), 
Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, VII, www.Marxists.org,  
 
 Another Marxist economist attracted the attention of “official” theorists : N. Kondratiev, 
whose long wave theory, exposed as soon as 1925, portrays capitalism as a system always ready 
to be reborn from its ashes20. In this theory, wars and political or social conflicts are more likely 
to occur in upward phases of long cycles, notably because economic growth exercises a pressure 
on the supply of raw materials. The downturn in raw materials’ prices is therefore an early sign 
of the beginning of a new long economic crisis. If it is known that Kondratiev was deported to 
Gulag and executed by the Stalinist regime, because of his pessimist views concerning the 
inevitability of capitalism’s disappearance, his reputation was enhanced by the works of Joseph 
Schumpeter based on his long-term cycles’ theory. Schumpeter is focused on the issue of major 
innovations liable to initiate a new phase of long-term economic growth: he rejects the idea that 
wars are important determinants for the gestation of those innovations, opening up a still current 
debate21. 
 Lastly, the First World War and the previous arms race, by requiring an increasing 
interventionism, have addressed the problem of the role of the state in the evolution of 
capitalism.  Hence, in his 1915 book Imperialism and world economy22, Nikolai Bukharin 
develops the idea according to which capitalism has reached a new stage of its development, 
the one of “State capitalism”, with a strong control of the state apparatus on economic activities,  
inducing the continuation of interventionism by the time peace returns. In the context of the 
worldwide fall in the rate of profit, illustrated by the internationalization of firms’ activities, the 
state plays an essential role in the promotion of national interests on world markets; but the 
diverging interests of the various nations may create the conditions for international economic 
disputes, the economic war being liable to end in an open military conflict, inter-imperialist 
agreements being unlikely. Bukharin’s views on international conflicts do not correspond to the 
pure economic determinism of Lenin’s thesis of 1916, as states as able to change the world 
markets’ structure through their foreign policy23. The historical materialism therefore indirectly 
comes into question.  
 
THE DEBATE ON THE POST-WORLD WAR I EUROPEAN ORDER, A CATALYST FOR 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
In the ECP, Keynes was in favor of reducing the reparations’ burden for the German economy, 
in view of the double objective of a quick recovery of the European economy and of the 
durability of democracy. His position was criticized in two ways : by Veblen, who accused him 
of defending the statu quo of an unfair and ineffective capitalist system and whose thought on 
inter-war international relations was pivotal in developing his institutionalist theory; by Ohlin 
and other economists, who challenge Keynes’ analysis of reparations, opening the way to a 
highly-focused debate on international transfers.  
                                                          
20 Kondratiev N. (1993 [1925]), Les grands cycles de la conjoncture, Paris, Economica. 
21 Coulomb F. Bensahel L., Fontanel J. (2011), “Economists' Controversies about the Causality between War and 
Economic Cycles”, in Chatterji M. ed., Business, Ethics and Peace, Emerald.  
22 Bukharin N. (1915), Imperialism and the world economy, London, Martin Lawrence Ltd 
23 Howard M.C., King J.E. (1989), A history of Marxian economics, Vol 1, Princeton, pp. 245-250. 
 Veblen’s attack on the institutions of capitalism through the question of war 
 Veblen’s critique of Keynes’ ECP 
Keynes will strongly mark the debate among economists on the relevance of the Treaty of 
Versailles’ clauses on the reparations imposed on Germany, with the publication of his 1919 
book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace. He incisively denounces the French position 
aiming at economically weakening the defeated country to prevent its rearmament and he 
advocates for a reduction in the reparations’ burden, giving ammunitions for the supporters of 
the idea that Germany has no capacity to pay. Keynes is concerned with the political 
consequences of the Treaty, fearing a power takeover by reactionary forces both in Germany 
and in Russia, leading to their rapprochement.  
From the military point of view an ultimate union of forces between Russia and Germany is 
greatly feared in some quarters. This would be much more likely to take place in the event of 
reactionary movements being successful in each of the two countries, whereas an effective unity 
of purpose between Lenin and the present essentially middle-class Government of Germany is 
unthinkable.24 
This position supportive of a political statu quo in Germany has been criticised by an heterodox 
economist, founding father of the institutionalist political economy, Thorstein Veblen. In his 
review of the ECP published in 1920, Veblen condemns the fact that the Allies’ policy is more 
aimed at combating Soviet Russia than at reforming German institutions, as the victors are eager 
above all to safeguard the capitalist interests. He writes:  
“So also his oversight of this paramount need of making the world safe for a democracy of 
absentee owners has led Mr Keynes to take an unduly pessimistic view of the provisions 
covering the German indemnity.”25 
Veblen there resumes a concept developed twenty years earlier in a key work, The theory of the 
leisure class : an economic study of institutions (1899)26. It was an analysis of the capitalism’s 
functioning, highlighting the predatory behavior of the ruling class (absentee owners), which is 
losing contact with the concrete labor, left to engineers: speculation and economies’ 
financialization are the inevitable outcomes.   
 The critique of capitalism through the analysis of the role of patriotism and warlike 
spirit 
The outreak of WWI brings to maturity Veblen’s theory, already inclined to address war and 
militarism’s issues, as it inquires into the internal factors of societal evolutions. In a key work 
published in 1915, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution27, Veblen introduces the 
                                                          
24 Keynes J.M. (1919), Economic consequences of the peace, Cosimo Classics, 2005, p. 289. 
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Science Quarterly, 35, pp. 467-472. 
26 Veblen T. (1899), The theory of the leisure class : an economic study of institutions, Macmillan. 
27 Veblen T. (1915), Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution, Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1964. 
distinction between predatory dynastic states (like Germany) and modern states (Great-Britain, 
USA).  
The predatory instincts of man have had a major impact on societies gone beyond the primitive 
stage, provoking the wars and conflicts that have marked the history of humanity and the 
changes in the institutions, the weakest ones being eliminated. Far from being mutually 
exclusive, war and trade have always interacted with each other, in spite of a perennial 
competition between commercial interests (prevailing in modern societies) and dynastic 
interests (prevailing in dynastic societies of industrially less developed countries). In dynastic 
societies, mental habits inherited from the feudal period (sense of duty, subordination, 
preparation for war…) still prevail, leading to more warlike policies than in modern societies : 
these latter being long accustomed to peace have benefited from an evolution in the mental 
habits, and are consequently more likely to develop peaceful activities, like trade or finance. 
The differences in the political systems (autocratic or democratic) result from these institutional 
differences and there is a risk of an international conflict initiated by dynastic states.  
However, Veblen’s theory is evolutionary but not determinist. The « normal » evolution of 
societies should in the long term transform all of them into modern States, as the changes in 
mental habits with the shifts in economic structures lead to institutional and social 
transformations. But as the evolution of societies ensues from a permanent adjustment between 
instincts and institutions, it is impossible to predict their future direction. In the dynastic states, 
forces of change (modernization) are exerted thanks to industrialization and technology boom, 
while in modern societies, the predatory instincts may spring back to life at any moment and 
lead to aggressive foreign policies.  
This latter point is studied in detail in a book written two years later, An inquiry into the nature 
of peace and the terms of its perpetuation (1917) 28, in which Veblen develops the three 
following ideas:  
- In dynastic societies, the preparation to war should cause organisational changes in dynastic 
societies, because of the growing sophistication of armaments needing advanced technologies 
and skilled manpower: these are factors for them to become modern societies (chapter 1),  that 
are more peaceful that dynastic ones.  
- In modern societies, the evolution of the economic system tends to erase all economic 
solidarity (the ordinary man becomes always more mindless) ; Only remains patriotism to 
federate the system. Modern societies are thus forced to maintain a kind of warlike spirit in the 
population, capable of bringing up one day feudal instincts prone to war.   (chapter 2) 
- The last chapter (7) develops a strong critique of the evolution of capitalism, which fosters 
a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. International initiatives for peace, and notably 
international institutions, are therefore regarded with caution by Veblen, even if he doesn’t 
venture to predict the future of the economic system.  
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Veblen’s attack on patriotism and institutions has arisen hostile reactions, of which the one of 
Roosevelt29. Veblen’s thought is however said to have had an influence on the content of the 
New Deal, through its critical approach of the institutions, even if there is no direct link30.  
The influence of Veblen was more direct on the Technocratic movement, created by Howard 
Scott in the 1920s31 and very popular in the United States in the 1930s ; this movement 
advocates for solutions largely inspired by Veblen’s 1921 book, The Engineers and the Price 
System32, in which he recommends the abandonment of the price system and the seizure of 
power by engineers and experts, who are the only ones capable of managing the production 
with a long-term vision, without being permanently focused on profit maximization.  
A further point to note is that Hobson was a huge fan of Veblen, to whom he devoted a book 
published in 1936. Both were heterodox authors rejecting the liberal theory and aiming at 
proposing alternative social models, out of the Marxist current.  
 
The debate on reparations and the premises of the Keynesian theory 
 The reparations imposed on Germany were a key issue in interwar international relations. 
The non-payment of indemnities by the Weimar Republic, undermined by hyperinflation, 
caused the occupation of the Ruhr by France (until 1925, following the German refusal to pay 
the sums due for 1923), while the Dawes Plan (1924) confirmed a restructuring of the 
indemnities, in contradiction of France’s demands, to allow the stabilization of the German 
currency and prevent the return of hyperinflation caused by money printing : lower amount of 
annuities, vagueness about their duration and, above all, an international loan of 800 millions 
(consisting mainly of bonds with a maturity of 25 years), to ensure the payment of the first 
annuity. Unable to generate lasting trade surpluses, Germany soon carried a heavy debt-service 
burden33. For the critics of the debt relief solution, this initiative has made it possible for 
Germany to pursue a rearmament program much more costly than the amount of indemnities 
set in 1921. The diagnosis about the German economic collapse in the 1920s was therefore 
wrong: it is a French economist, Etienne Mantoux, who has expounded this idea in « La paix 
calomniée ou les conséquences économiques de Monsieur Keynes » (written in 1943 and 
published in 1946) 34. The complete renunciation of reparations decided in 1932 was held to 
have given to the German public opinion the signal of a permissiveness concerning the 
rearmament issue : Clémenceau has thus denounced in 1930 the revenge and militaristic spirit 
of the German elites in the aftermath of the defeat, and the immediate secrete rearmament35.  
 
                                                          
29 About the debates to which Veblen’s books have given rise, see : Daniel Borus, Twentieth-Century 
Multiplicity: American Thought and Culture, 1900-1920, 236-237) 
30 Tilman R.(2004) , Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, C. Wright Mills and the Generic Ends of Life, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 61-63. 
31 Veblen was besides member of the first movement founded by Howard Scott in 1919, The Technical Alliance.  
32 Veblen T. (1921), The engineers and the price system, B.W. Huebsch 
33 Fiore M. (2002), Les banques suisses, le franc et l’Allemagne, Genève, Paris, Droz, page 37. 
34 Mantoux E. (1946), La paix calomniée ou les conséquences économiques de M. Keynes, Paris, Gallimard. 
35 Clémenceau G. (1930), Grandeurs et misères d’une victoire, Paris, Librairie Plon.  
 The Keynes-Ohlin debate 
 
It is this issue of Germany’s capacity to pay the reparations that has concentrated the 
economists’ concerns at that time. This debate was called the « transfer problem », because the 
challenge for Germany was to get enough foreign currencies and gold to be able to transfer due 
amounts to recipient countries. Its most famous episode is probably the publication of an article 
written by Keynes in the Economic Journal in March 1929, titled « The German Transfer 
Problem » 36 and Ohlin’s answer in the same review, in June37. The French economist Jacques 
Rueff has also contributed to the debate in this review (September)38, directly criticizing 
Keynes’ view and supporting France’s position.  
The arguments presented during the course of the debate have been subsequently discussed at 
very great length, so much so that this debate has become quasi mythical.  It is known that 
Keynes did not use arguments compatible with the General Theory published in 1936 : his 
argument is based on a classical view, with the anticipation of negative terms-of-trade effects 
for Germany as a result of the transfers39.  
Besides, the issue of the international loans to Germany expected from the Dawes Plan has also 
launched a controversy. According to the American economist H.G. Moulton, the induced debt 
may become dangerous for the German economy and these loans are high risk. But the 
American bank lobby dismissed his arguments, while the largest financial institutions 
transfered the risk on those loans to small financial institutions and ignorant investors40.  
 
Ohlin blamed Keynes for not having taken into account the existence of these loans to Germany 
from 1924, and to have kept on analysing the reparations issue in the same way as in 1919. 
Ohlin argues that the capital flows to Germany, mainly American,  have rendered erroneous the 
assertion of Germany’s inability to pay, as the United States have invested in Germany twice 
as much as the amount paid by Germany for reparations.  
  
Concerning the structural consequences of these payments, Keynes and Ohlin had two different 
interpretations. Keynes’ argumentation is similar to that of ECP in 1919 : in Germany, the 
devaluation and/or the deflation induced by the additional taxes financing reparations will not 
be enough to generate the trade surplus necessary to transfer the owed amounts, as marks must 
be converted to foreign currencies: indeed, the problem with Germany is that it is a key 
importing country, with a not export-oriented economy.  If the industry of exports grows to the 
detriment of the domestic production, the flow of German products on the world market can 
lead to falling prices and to a worsening of the terms of trade for Germany. The burden of 
reparations on the German economy is therefore much more important than it seems at first 
sight. Keynes rejected the idea that the American loans have settled the transfer problem,  
contrary to what Ohlin thought.  
                                                          
36 Keynes J.M. (1929), “The German transfer problem”, Economic Journal, 39, March, 1-7 
37 Ohlin B. (1929), “The reparation problem: a discussion”, Economic Journal, 39, June, 172-178. 
38 Rueff M.J. (1929), « Mr. Keynes’ views on the transfer problem », Economic Journal, 39, September, 388-
399. 
39 Brakman S., Van Marrewijk C. (2007), Transfers, non traded goods and unemployment, an analysis of the 
Keynes – Ohlin debate, History of Political Economy, 39 (1), p. 122. 
40 Fraga A. (1986), German reparations and Brazilian debt : a comparison, Princeton University, page 25. 
For Ohlin, the lack of any significant change in Germany’s structure of production in the 1920s 
(high production of capital goods for the home market without a development of the export 
goods’ sector) is explained by the size of American loans to Germany: the issue of its capacity 
to pay has become irrelevant.  
 
Ohlin challenged Keynes’ view on reparations by using an analysis the development of incomes 
in the different involved countries : the rise in taxes in Germany for the reparation payments 
induce a decrease in incomes and demand in the country and therefore a fall in imports ; 
conversely, the recipient countries benefit from a rise in factors incomes and therefore favors 
German exports. There is no transfer problem nor change in the terms of trade.  
According to Metzler41, Ohlin’s « orthodox » explanation is innovative because international 
income transfers were mentioned for the first time. From a theoretical perspective, it represents 
an intermediary between the classical theory and the Keynesian one²² : Keynesian because it 
deals with trends in purchasing power  and Classical as it  assumes full employment and the 
validity of the Say’s law.  
In the opinion of Robert Mundell42 Ohlin was the clear winner of the debate with Keynes. 
 
One year earlier, in 1928, the French economist Jacques Rueff43 had contested the existence of 
a transfer problem, by reference to the automatic adjustment of balance of payments’ 
mechanism, related to the quantity theory of money.  The purchase of foreign currencies by 
Germany on financial markets (financed through a rise in taxes or by loans) would cause an 
increase in German currency and therefore its decline in value against other currencies. The 
weaker Reichsmark has a stimulating effect on German exports, which would enable the 
transfers. Rueff put forward again this point in the Economic Journal in September 1929, in 
addition to the Keynes-Ohlin debate.  
 
 The transfer problem and the emerging Keynesian thought 
 
Keynes’ analysis of the transfer problem was not “Keynesian” yet. However, three key ideas 
are reflected in it:  
- The fear of an « economic war » : Keynes thought that Germany’s necessity to create a trade 
surplus would induce a price war damaging for the whole European industry ;  
- The fear of a decrease in the people standard of living in Germany : for him, honoring the 
debts is less important than public welfare, rampart against fascism or communism; 
- The distrust of capital international flows: loans to Germany has been a key element in the 
overexpansion of the world financial sphere, leading to the great crash of 1929.  
Regarding this third point, the transfer debate was major in the genesis of the Keynesian theory. 
According to Robert Skidelsky44, Keynes’ analysis of the transfer problem contributes to the 
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debate on the nature of the imperialism of capitalist economies : the superiority of Keynes’ 
approach compared with the Hobson/Lenin thesis of imperialism is to have shown that the 
export of savings is not offset by an induced rise in foreign investment. Yet, according to 
Hobson’s theory, only foreign investment can lead to a rise in exports preventing crises 
resulting from over-production.  
Skidelsdy explains:   
Keynes pointed out that the expansion of exports which a net transfer of money abroad required 
could be blocked at both ends: the capital exporting country might be unwilling or unable to 
increase its competitiveness sufficiently to allow the 'real' transfer of goods and services to take 
place; and the capital importing country might not be willing to suffer the loss of its own 
competitiveness. His argument was conducted in terms of a fixed exchange rate system, but it 
can be adapted to a system of managed floating. 
According to Skidelsky, Keynes’ mistrust in capital exports results from his analysis of 
unemployment in Great Britain in the 1920s, which stems directly from his thinking on the 
transfer problem linked to reparation payments imposed on Germany. The transfer debate has 
therefore proved essential in the emergence of an original Keynesian thought.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The interwar period was a favorable time for economists’ discussions, which were important 
in the history of economic thought. The liberal orthodoxy is weakened by the outbreak of WWI, 
which refuted its optimistic view concerning the peacemaking effects of economic 
globalization. The Marxist theory, which has incorporated Hobson’s analysis of imperialism, is 
significantly challenged by an abundance of contradicting interpretations regarding the 
evolution and survival of the capitalist system. The emerging Institutionalist theory is enriched 
by Veblen’s critical analyses of international relations, based on a categorization of countries’ 
institutions. Arising from the Treaty of Versailles, the debate on reparations reveals the 
prominent place of economists in the political debate of the period, concerning the Allies’ 
policy towards Germany; and also, the complexity of interwar financial and trade linkages and 
the great volume of international capital flows.  
On both points, Keynes’ view prefigures the idea of public welfare as a major objective of 
public policy and the mistrust towards international finance, paving the way for his subsequent 
critic of financial markets, expressed in the General Theory.  
Lastly, one final remark is that this debate has revealed the vagueness of the data on national 
economies and international economic flows, at that time. It will only be dispelled with the 
progressive upgrading of national accounting systems, based on Keynes’ works, well after the 
Second World War.  
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